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Abstract:  Problem  statement:  A  belief  prevails  today  that  pluralist  liberal  societies  and  genuine 
religious belief are incompatible.  Until this belief is overcome it is unlikely that progress can be made 
toward  dialogue  between  liberal  pluralists,  who  pride  themselves  on  their  open-mindedness  and 
rationality, and religious conservatives in America and theocrats elsewhere who esteem their devotion 
equally  highly.    Approach:  Compare  the  rationality  of  “paradigm  shifts”  and  that  of  religious 
conversion.    Results:  There  was  no  difference  in  rationality  between  scientific  progress  when 
understood as a “paradigm shift” and that between conversion from theism to atheism or vice versa. 
Conclusion:  Neither secularists nor theists were justified in their belief that liberalism and theism are 
incompatible. Pluralities of beliefs are all equally justifiable in terms of reason.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  A  belief  prevails  today  that  pluralist  liberal 
societies and genuine religious belief are incompatible. 
If  we  wish  to  draw  crude  sides  in  the  disagreement-
liberals  and  religious  conservatives-we  can  see  that 
members of both parties share this belief. On the one 
hand, certain theocracies ban all artifacts of “western 
culture” even when they are not obviously forbidden by 
Islamic  law.    Likewise,  religious  conservatives  in 
America  have  also  turned  “liberal”  into  a  term  of 
contempt.  On the other hand the French are pushing to 
outlaw the Burka.  
  At  the  root  of  this  dispute  is  a  conviction  that 
“reason” is incompatible with belief in many religious 
dogmas. This claim undergirds the liberal theories of 
even  those  most  sympathetic  toward  religion  such  as 
Rawls (2005; 1997), who seeks to permit a pluralism of 
“reasonable”  religions.  Until  this  belief  in  the 
incompatibility  of  liberalism  and  religious  belief  is 
addressed  it  is  unlikely  that  progress  can  be  made 
toward  dialogue  between  liberal  pluralists,  who  pride 
themselves  on  their  open-mindedness  and  rationality, 
and  Islamic  theocrats  and  religious  conservatives  in 
America who esteem their devotion equally highly. To 
that  end,  then,  I  hope  to  propose  a  conception  of 
rationality that is compatible  with both scientific and 
religious belief (In this I am closely following the work 
of Van Fraassen (2002). This study can be seen as an 
extension  of  that  work  to  address  political  problems. 
For more on Van Fraassen’s work I direct the reader to 
Van Fraassen, 2002).  
  In order to do this, I explain Bas Van Fraassen’s 
discussion of “conceptual revolutions” in The Empirical 
Stance and apply his criteria for their existence to the 
fictional  conversion  of  Zosima  in  Dostoevsky  et  al. 
(2002)  The  Brothers  Karamazov.  After  showing  that 
this  conversion  fits  Van  Fraassen’s  profile  of  a 
rationally acceptable conceptual revolution I will argue 
that such conversions from atheism to theism or vice 
versa can be reasonable in exactly the same way that 
the scientific progress they laude is. I will then argue 
that  if  this  conception  of  rationality  is  accurate  the 
alleged moral bankruptcy of pluralist societies can, in 
fact, foster conversion to a morally focused religion. I 
conclude by arguing that nothing about a conception of 
rationality that accepts political pluralism is inherently 
productive or destructive to either atheism or theism, 
Islamic or otherwise.  
 
Conceptual revolutions: Before discussing the special 
case of conversion I need to spend some time dealing 
with  the  epistemological  problems  presented  by 
“conceptual revolutions” in general.  Instances of such 
revolutions abound in the history of science, and those 
discussing  these  changes  have  made  various  claims 
about how  they are best understood.  I  will  not here 
enter into this discussion, but simply adopt the analysis 
given  by  Van  Fraassen  (2002).  He  describes  such 
changes as having four essential characteristics. First, 
one set of theoretical beliefs is abandoned for another, 
and second, both the temporally prior and temporally 
posterior  are,  to  some  extent,  comparable.  Taken 
together,  these  can  be  called  the  characteristics  of J. Social Sci., 6 (2): 229-233, 2010 
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comparable belief change. Third, from the perspective 
of the prior, the posterior is absurd, and fourth from the 
perspective of the posterior the prior is comprehensible 
as an error. Taken together these two can be called the 
characteristics of perspectival asymmetry.  
  If at least some of the changes in our intellectual 
history can be rightfully characterized as having such 
asymmetry,  we  are  confronted  with  two  major 
epistemological difficulties. Assuming rationality is an 
essential component to all warranted changes in belief, 
how can the adoption of what was once regarded as an 
absurd belief, however beneficial it turns out to be, ever 
be rational? It is important to note here that, from the 
position  of  the  prior  perspective,  the  awareness  that 
one’s  beliefs  include  an  error  is  simply  unavailable, 
regardless of how clear it is from the posterior position. 
Without appealing to some fantastic meta-view that can 
evaluate and compare  various perspectives outside of 
any set of beliefs, it seems that a rational sanction for 
such  a  change  in  view  does  not  exist.  This  problem 
leads  to  a  crisis  in  confidence  regarding  our  present 
beliefs.  If  a  past  irrational  change  was  necessary  in 
order to uncover the error of my former beliefs, might 
some present error persist that can be understood only 
through some seemingly irrational change? I will later 
show  how  some  religious  conversions  are  accurately 
described by these four conditions, but let us first see 
how  Van  Fraassen  deals  with  these  problems  in  the 
domain of scientific belief.  
 
From rationality to reasonableness: Van Fraassen’s 
answer  involves  expanding  our  understanding  of 
warranted  epistemological  practice.  Let’s  first  sketch 
how  we  traditionally  conceive  of  normal 
epistemological practices. We start with some accepted 
data  set  from  which  obvious  beliefs  are  immediately 
derived,  something  like  “normal  experience  of  the 
world” for example. Right now I see twenty people in 
this room and so I am warranted in my belief that there 
are  twenty  other  people  in  the  room.  This  set  will 
exclude things like experiences under the influence of 
hallucinogens and scripturally reported but miraculous 
occurrences  (whose  very  existence  presents 
hermeneutic problems that we will for the time being 
ignore).  We  add  to  this  set  certain  rules  for  belief 
transformation:  induction,  deduction,  abduction  etc. 
Any  transformation  of  the  beliefs  generated  by  the 
original data set performed according to these rules will 
yield  additional  beliefs  that  are  rationally  warranted. 
So, for example, I have been outside a number of times 
when it has been raining, and each time I got wet. I 
perform the rule sanctioned action “induction” on my 
beliefs “I got wet when outside in the rain at times T1 
through Tn,” and generate the new rationally warranted 
belief: whenever I stand outside in the rain I will get 
wet. Any proper application of these rules will generate 
rationally  acceptable  beliefs,  and  the  acceptance  of 
many  beliefs  generated  by  the  proper  application  of 
these rules is rationally compelled. I am thus irrational 
if,  despite  overwhelming  evidence  to  the  contrary,  I 
believe that the next time I walk out in the rain I will 
not  get  wet.  Furthermore,  all  beliefs  that  are  not 
generated by the original data set or through the rule 
governed operations performed on this set are irrational.  
  This is an oversimplification to be sure. There can 
be  arguments  over  which  rules  are  licit  in  which 
circumstances, what counts as the original data set, and 
so  forth.  However,  this  sketch  captures  one  essential 
feature:  knowledge  claims  must  be  justified  by 
reference to a set of data that is in principle accessible 
to  anyone  and  by  rules  that  all  agents  can  and  must 
follow.  This  is,  in  a  nutshell,  the  triumph  of 
Enlightenment  rationalists  over  religious  dogmatists 
lauded  by  the  so-called  “New  Atheists”-Dawkins, 
Dennett, Hitchens and Harris.  
  Van Fraassen hopes to replace this conception of 
rationality  with  one  that  he  characterizes  as  “bridled 
irrationality.”    Among  the  various  arguments  he 
employs, we will focus on those he makes against the 
claim that these rules can ever be “value free.”  If we 
are  forced  to  admit  values  in  warranted  belief 
generating process, then maybe there is some room for 
different  people  holding  different  beliefs  about  the 
same phenomena.  
 
Epistemic  values:  In  order  to  expand  the  traditional 
conception of rationality, Van Fraassen points out that 
our belief generating activity, like all activity, is guided 
by  some  value-implying  end.  The  two  most  obvious 
and least controversial of these ends are the avoidance 
of  holding  untrue  beliefs,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
holding  of  all  “relevantly”  true  beliefs,  on  the  other. 
Although there is nothing in principle preventing our 
holding all and only true beliefs (aside from our limited 
mental  capacity)  in  practice  the  degree  to  which  we 
seek one end we are limited in our pursuit of the other.  
How, then, do we determine the appropriate “balance” 
of  these  competing  ends?  Usually  our  practical 
concerns make this a fairly simple task. When planning 
a trip to the movies to see A Simple Man, for example, 
I need to know: what time the movie is playing (but not 
to the nano-second), if the movie is going to draw a 
large  crowd,  if  the  person  I  am  going  with  is 
consistently late.  
  There  are,  furthermore,  situations  in  which 
multiple  beliefs,  resultant  from  various  rule-governed J. Social Sci., 6 (2): 229-233, 2010 
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activity of equally rational permissibility, are available. 
It is common practice to appeal to “aesthetic” values in 
order to decide between beliefs in these circumstances. 
Hence the discussion of “elegance” in mathematics and 
“Ockham’s  Razor”  in  physics.  When  distinguishing 
between theoretical explanations of the same “data” set, 
such criteria inevitably creep in to the extent that we 
diminish  the  desire  to  “avoid  error”  for  the  sake  of 
“holding  true  beliefs.”  Of  course  a  thoroughgoing 
skeptic need not accept the inclusion of such values, but 
if we are not to renounce all of our beliefs then it would 
behoove us to acknowledge them. 
  Perhaps these values will help better understand the 
apparent irrationalism of conceptual revolutions and in 
turn religious conversion. If they are to do this, we must 
determine  when appealing to values is appropriate. It 
seems  uncontroversial  to  claim  that,  under 
circumstances  in  which  these  values  are  acceptable 
criteria for belief discrimination (not generation) beliefs 
held by these criteria are neither rationally compelled 
nor  unreasonable  held.  The  traditional  epistemologist 
can accept this claim and simply deny the existence of 
any  such  circumstances.  What,  then,  would  such 
circumstances  look  like?    It  appears  to  me  that  two 
criteria  must  be  met:  The  true  belief  cannot  be 
determined rationally, yet the choice between the two 
must be  forced. Let  us examine these in some detail 
(The debt here to William James’s discussion in “The 
Will  to  Believe”  is  noted  by  Van  Fraassen  (2002).  
Although James includes a third criteria, that of a ‘live 
option,’  I  have  omitted  it  since  one  cannot  have  a 
forced choice between any but two live options).  
  The choice between beliefs must not be decided by 
any  of  the  traditionally  accepted  rules  for  belief 
generation. An outlandish example of such a situation 
might be something like the choice between the beliefs 
that  there  are  ten  or  zero  invisible  elephants  in  this 
room  fighting  to  the  death.  The  very  insensibility  of 
these  elephants  guarantees  their  absence  from  the 
original data  set in such a  way that any belief about 
their  number  can  be  neither  rationally  compelled  nor 
rationally  forbidden.  This  is  all  well  and  good,  the 
traditionalist will say, but we can simply be agnostic in 
this case. The very same condition that guarantees that 
the  proper  belief  cannot  be  rationally  compelled  also 
permits an indefinite deferral of the choice.  
  The  second  criteria,  then,  is  that  the  choice  be 
forced.  Certainly  plenty  of  choices  are  forced.  Each 
morning I can either remain in bed or get out. Many 
action heroes are forced to save the person they love, or 
one of “great importance.”  These are choices of action, 
however, and do not entail a belief that their action will 
result in success. I may lie in bed only to feel such guilt 
at not getting up that I am  unable to rest. Hope that 
one’s actions will have the desired outcome is certainly 
not a licit ground for belief that they will. If we can 
dissociate our beliefs from our actions, then, it seems 
that a choice between rationally open beliefs is never 
forced.  
  Is it always possible to dissociate action and belief? 
It  turns  out  that  it  is  not  in  precisely  those 
circumstances where the beliefs to be chosen between 
are  those  “theoretical  beliefs”  which  allow  us  to 
understand  the  circumstance  in  which  we  find 
ourselves-enabling action in the first place.  Imagine a 
strict  behaviorist  who  does  not  believe  in  “mental 
entities” such as “ill will.”  The related notions of guilt 
and  responsibility  will  have  no  import  for  her 
understanding of a circumstance in which one person 
harms  another.  This  does  not  mean  that  she  cannot 
advocate  a  jail-term  for  those  who  perform  harm-
inducing  actions,  but  it  does  mean  that  she  cannot 
advocate this jail-term as punishment for ill will, but 
only for the sake of deterrence or rehabilitation.  
  Now, if a circumstance demands action of any sort, 
then  some  rationally  open  choice  between  ways  of 
understanding  the  circumstance  itself  may  be 
practically  forced.    In  these  circumstances  different 
values, fidelity to perceived experience or consistence 
with  accepted  science,  must  be  invoked  in  order  to 
make a choice. Furthermore, since we are forced to act, 
agnosticism is not an option.  
  The question we must now ask ourselves is, once 
we  have already adopted certain  foundational beliefs, 
when  is  it  reasonably  permissible  to  abandon  those 
beliefs for others? Precisely in those circumstances in 
which the understanding of the situations in which we 
find ourselves are “unsatisfactory.”  Since I’m running 
out of time, I’ll have to leave us with this unsatisfying 
description of these circumstances and merely point to 
examples of such “unsatisfactory” understandings, such 
as  the  plethora  of  epicycles  needed  to  preserve  the 
circular  motion of the  heavenly bodies in astronomy, 
and  the  existence  of  horrendous  evils  that  challenge 
religion.  
 
Religious  conversion  as  conceptual  revolution:  We 
have now identified situations in which we may, with 
warrant,  adopt  and  renounce  foundational  beliefs 
without being rationally compelled to so do. As Van 
Fraassen (2002) points out, this discovery allows us to 
understand how “conceptual revolutions”. In the history 
of  science  can  be  considered  reasonable.  Let’s  now 
examine  whether  some  religious  conversions  can  be 
understood as similarly revolutionary, and if so whether 
they are reasonable in the same way. In order to do this, J. Social Sci., 6 (2): 229-233, 2010 
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I  will  examine  the  conversion  of  Zosima  in 
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.  Let us first see 
if  Zosima’s  conversion  possesses  the  four 
characteristics  of  conceptual  revolutions.  There  is 
certainly  a  comparable  change  in  belief.  Zosima 
renounces  his  belief  that  he  is  justified  in  having 
Afanasy serve him. Perhaps more importantly, there has 
been a clear change in certain foundational beliefs. His 
changed conception of human dignity explains not only 
his new beliefs about the inappropriateness of human 
servitude,  but  also  his  beliefs  in  the  nature  of 
responsibility. So much for the comparable transition, 
but what about the conditions of asymmetry?  
  The  absurdity  of  his  new  beliefs  from  the 
“perspective”  of  those  he  previously  held  is  clearly 
attested to in at least two instances. Zosima understood 
his brother’s conversion, one similar to his own, as a 
madness  explicable  only  as  material  illness. 
Furthermore, the accusations made against him by his 
comrades,  who  held  beliefs  similar  to  his  prior  to 
conversion, that he was either “mad” or a coward for 
having  thrown  his  gun  into  a  tree  indicate  that  the 
beliefs underlying such an action must be absurd.  
  And what of the intelligibility of his prior beliefs 
from the point of view of the posterior? The following 
speech,  made  in  response  to  the  accusation  of  his 
comrades, attests to this final condition:  
 
“Yesterday  I  was  still  a fool, but today I’ve 
grown wiser […] I ought to have confessed as 
soon as we arrived here, even before his shot, 
without leading him into great and mortal sin, 
but we have arranged everything in the world 
so  repugnantly  that  to  do  so  was  nearly 
impossible, for only now that I have stood up 
to his shot from twelve paces can my words 
mean  something  for  him,  but  had  I  done  it 
before  his  shot,  as  soon  as  we  arrived,  then 
people should simply say” he’s a coward, he’s 
afraid of a pistol, there’s no point in listening 
to  him  (Dostoevsky  et  al.,  2002).    For  the 
complete context, see Book Six, Chapter 2 of 
this study.)”  
 
  If  these  four  characteristics  are  sufficient 
conditions for a “paradigm shift” then we clearly have 
one on our hands. We are now in a position to evaluate 
the reasonableness of this shift.  
 
Reasonableness of religious conversion: If we are to 
understand Zosima’s conversion as reasonable, then we 
must identify the “unsatisfactory” understanding of the 
world in  which  he lived and the  “foundational belief 
(s)”  that  lead  to  them.  Whatever  beliefs  regarding 
religion  Zosima  had  prior  to  his  conversion,  we  can 
point to several results they generated which can only 
be considered unsatisfying. Not only had he failed to 
win  the  girl  of  his  fancy,  he  was  humiliated  upon 
discovering  that  she  had  been  engaged  the  entire 
duration of his infatuation with her. After striking his 
servant in the face in an attempt to “blow off” his anger 
he felt not relief, but “something, as it were, mean and 
shameful  in  (his)  soul.”  Each  of  these  circumstances 
has  to  do,  in  some  respect,  with  the  idea  of  human 
dignity and worth. Although he could have continued to 
maintain his conception of human dignity as it was, in 
order to do so would have required him to ignore the 
bloodied face of his servant and attempt to kill a man 
who  brought  happiness  to  a  woman  he  loved.  Such 
actions seem at least as unsatisfying as the invention of 
epicycles  to  correct  for  observations  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  
  As Van Fraassen points out, however, one cannot 
renounce a belief, no matter how unsatisfying, if there 
is no known alternative. This is particularly true in the 
case of “foundational beliefs” about which we cannot 
be  agnostic  since  they  enable  us  to  understand  our 
experiences. From what we know of Zosima’s life, the 
religious  alternative  espoused  by  his  brother  was  the 
only viable alternative for him. His new belief allowed 
him  to  better  deal  with  his  servant  and  former  love, 
without eliminating his ability to deal with his former 
comrades, who accepted his desire to become a monk. 
The conversion, then, allowed him to deal with other 
humans as well or better than his prior belief, even if 
from  the  perspective  of  that  prior  belief,  it  seemed 
absurd  to  accept  responsibility  for  all  one’s  fellow 
humans.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  If this is an adequate examination, then it appears 
that  religious  conversion,  from  atheism  to  theism  or 
vice versa, can be reasonable. The asymmetry need not 
privilege one set of beliefs over another absolutely, but 
only in relation to the set of experiences with which one 
is confronted. Problems such as the suffering brought 
about in the name of religious through war, or priestly 
abuse can lead to as unsatisfactory an understanding for 
the  world  as  the  feelings  of  loneliness  or 
meaninglessness that often occur in western culture. It 
should be noted here that a pluralist society facilitates 
both  reasonable  conversion,  insofar  as  it  makes 
apparent  the  options  one  has  for  dealing  with 
“unsatisfying”  results  of  one’s  current  conceptual 
scheme, and the reasonableness of religion, insofar as J. Social Sci., 6 (2): 229-233, 2010 
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those religious beliefs that produce unsatisfying results 
for  the  believer  will  be  abandoned  for  those  that 
produce  more  satisfying  results.  Liberal  pluralism,  it 
would  seem,  neither  favors  atheism  nor  condemns 
theism.  To  this  extent  devout  Islamists  ought  neither 
fear nor condemn liberal societies-which may promote 
their  acceptance-and  belligerent  atheists  ought  not 
condemn religious folk as irrational. Neither of these 
views  are  warranted  by  an  accurate  conception  of 
rationality. 
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